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Most research in the area of intrusion detection requires datasets to develop, evaluate or compare systems in
one way or another. In this eld, however, nding suitable datasets is a challenge on to itself. Most publicly
available datasets have negative qualities that limit their usefulness. In this article, we propose ID2T (Intrusion
Detection Dataset Toolkit) to tackle this problem. ID2T facilitates the creation of labeled datasets by injecting
synthetic aacks into background trac. e injected synthetic aacks blend themselves with the background
trac by mimicking the background trac’s properties to eliminate any trace of ID2T’s usage.
is work has three core contribution areas. First, we present a comprehensive survey on intrusion detection
datasets. In the survey, we propose a classication to group the negative qualities we found in the datasets.
Second, the architecture of ID2T is revised, improved and expanded. e architectural changes enable ID2T
to inject recent and advanced aacks such as the widespread EternalBlue exploit or botnet communication
paerns. e toolkit’s new functionality provides a set of tests, known as TIDED (Testing Intrusion Detection
Datasets), that help identify potential defects in the background trac into which aacks are injected. ird,
we illustrate how ID2T is used in dierent use-case scenarios to evaluate the performance of anomaly and
signature-based intrusion detection systems in a reproducible manner. ID2T is open source soware and is
made available to the community to expand its arsenal of aacks and capabilities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Evaluating the detection capabilities of NIDSs (Network Intrusion Detection Systems) has become
a crucial task in today’s Internet age [36]. It is not only due to our dependency on the Internet,
but also because of the Internet’s threat landscape that NIDSs have become an almost mandatory
line of defense against aacks. is need to develop NIDSs that can keep up with evolving aacks
and motivated adversaries has yielded much research in the direction of identifying old and new,
previously unobserved, threats. Evaluating NIDS has intrinsic complexities and challenges that
need to be addressed irrespective of which intrusion detection method they use. e evaluation of
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NIDSs relies on quality datasets to assess their capabilities. ality datasets are also what enables
accurate comparison of dierent intrusion detection methods. Reliable datasets, however, are not
readily available.
Reliable datasets useful for the evaluation of NIDSs are hard to obtain. Widely available datasets
tend to be outdated, oen lack labeled aacks and usually contain overlooked defects. Furthermore,
these datasets are oen not publicly available or dicult to obtain [18]. Most datasets are distributed
as PCAP (Packet Capture) les. ese les, being in essence just an ordered collection of network
packets, can be thought as of having packets originating from one of two sources: a benign or a
malicious one. Packets originating from benign sources compose the normal or background trac
of the dataset. Packets created by malicious activities on a network compose the aack trac of
the dataset. To overcome the seemingly inherent diculties of creating and sharing datasets, we
have developed ID2T. ID2T is a tool that creates and injects synthetic aack trac into background
trac. Rather that just naı¨vely merging together the background and aack trac, ID2T aempts
to replicate the properties of the background trac in the synthetic aack trac. e level by
which properties are replicated is controlled by the user to suite their needs.
Users of ID2T are not conned to only injecting the set of aacks provided. e instruments to
develop new aacks are provided. ese come in the form of an API (Application Programming
Interface) to easily extract, compare and replicate trac properties.
e design philosophy of ID2T is simple: background trac is provided by the user and ID2T
adds aacks to the background trac following the specications of the user. e injected aacks
are labeled and clearly identied for intrusion detection mechanisms to use; for instance, for
evaluation purposes. Figure 1 shows the main architectural components that together interact to
create datasets with synthetic aacks that replicate background trac’s properties. e inputs
of ID2T are a PCAP le containing background data and user supplied parameters. Its output is
a PCAP le injected with synthetic aacks, a labels le specifying the time and location of the
injected aacks, and a report on the statistical analysis of the background trac.
Figure 1. ID2T provides all what is needed to create datasets that contain aacks that replicate the properties
of arbitrary background traic. The output dataset, in the form of a PCAP file, contains labeled aacks that
suite the needs of the user.
1.1 Contributions
is work substantially extends two earlier publications [7, 35]. e rst publication presents the
idea of ID2T in the form of a poster [7]. In the poster, we presented a basic architecture for injecting
aacks that replicate background trac’s properties along with the basic requirements to do so.
In the second work, we formalized the requirements for injecting aacks, we built a prototype,
and we evaluated the prototype’s performance and ability to inject aacks [35]. is work has the
following additional contributions:
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• We present a comprehensive survey of NIDS datasets and synthetic dataset generation
tools as well as a categorization of the problems found in these.
• We release ID2T as an open source1 soware to help NIDS researchers to create, distribute
and replicate datasets.
• We develop the ID2T module named TIDED that calculates quantitative characteristics of
network trac that help researchers determine whether background network trac has
abnormal characteristics.
• We implement a number of recent aacks. For instance, these include the popular Wan-
nacry aack, based on the EternalBlue exploit, as an injectable aack within ID2T. is
aack highlights how synthetic aacks can be easily created in contrast to generating
and publishing whole new datasets that contain the same aack. We further demonstrate
use-case scenarios that show how ID2T can be used to evaluate NIDSs in a reproducible
way.
1.2 The Limitations of ID2T
ID2T limits itself to replicating the properties of user-supplied background trac into synthetically
generated aack trac. Many aack scenarios are not aected by this limitation, others, however,
may be negatively aected. If an aack is not expected to alter the state of a network, the replication
strategy employed by ID2T is sucient. In this category of aacks we nd most exploit aempts
and network reconnaissance scans. In contrast, if an aack is expected to change how packets are
produced and distributed in a network, ID2T will only approximate the real eects of the aack.
Most denial of service and botnet aacks fall into this category.
A second limitation exists that is related to the labeling of aack trac. A dataset suitable for
evaluating NIDS needs to have labeled aacks. ID2T indeed labels all synthetically injected aacks.
However, if the provided background trac contains aacks, not all aacks would be labeled. To
try and leverage this problem, ID2T analyses the background trac provided by the user so as to
highlight or make existing aacks stand out.
1.3 Outline
e remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we propose a set of requirements
for datasets that are suitable for the evaluation of NIDSs as well as for injecting synthetic aacks.
Section 3 discusses the state of the art in static and dynamic datasets for the evaluation of NIDS
and algorithms. We further categorize some of the defects found in these datasets. With Section 4
we begin the analysis of our toolkit (ID2T), its architecture and components. In addition, Section
5 touches one important component of ID2T that is responsible for the testing and analysis of
intrusion detection datasets. Subsequently, the aacks that can be generated by our toolkit are
presented in Section 6. Section 7, shows use cases that demonstrate how ID2T can be applied to
evaluate anomaly and signature-based NIDSs. Finally, Section 8 concludes this article.
2 REQUIREMENTS
Many requirements concern the creation and injection of synthetic aacks. On the one hand,
there are requirements related to the tool that injects the aacks. On the other hand, there are
requirements inherent to the resulting datasets, containing injected aacks, that are meant to
be used for the evaluation of IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems). is section emphasizes this
distinction and divides the requirements into functional and non-functional ones.
1e source code of ID2T can be found in hps://github.com/tklab-tud/ID2T.
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2.1 Requirements of Datasets Suitable for the Evaluation of IDSs
Irrespective of whether datasets contain synthetic or real data, they need to conform to certain
requirements if they are to be used for the evaluation of NIDSs. From observations made in our
research in the eld of IDS (i.e., [7, 34–37]), as well as from the research of others [3, 18, 22, 29], we
have derived dierent requirements that make datasets usable in the context of evaluating NIDSs.
In the following, these requirements are split into functional and non-functional ones.
2.1.1 Functional Requirements. ese functional requirements focus on what is needed to con-
struct or assemble datasets that enable dierent NIDSs to compare their performance against each
other.
(1) Payload availability — Due to privacy, network payloads are oen unavailable. is limits
the capability of NIDSs to detect aacks at the payload level (e,g., application layer exploits).
To serve NIDSs that aim at detecting aacks at the payload level, one needs datasets that
include payloads.
(2) Labeled aacks — Datasets need labels that distinguish malicious from benign network
trac. Labels enable NIDSs to determine their detection accuracy and to establish a direct
comparison against other NIDSs.
(3) Ground truth — Labeled trac is not enough if it cannot be guaranteed that the background
trac does not contain unlabeled aacks. Without ground truth, a direct comparison
between dierent NIDSs is not possible.
(4) Growing — A growing dataset is one that is constantly updated with traces of recent
network trac paerns and aacks.
(5) Aack diversity — Datasets usually focus on certain types of aacks. A dataset suitable for
the evaluation of dierent NIDSs requires a diversied set of network aacks, from DoSs
(Denial of Services) to remote exploitation aempts.
2.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements. e following non-functional requirements specify the
criteria datasets need to satisfy to be of practical use.
(1) Public availability or ease of reproducibility — Although being obvious, this requirement
needs to be explicitly stated. Datasets need to be created with the goal of becoming public or
easily reproduced. If a dataset is used for multiple evaluations, for the purpose of replicating
experiments, it must be made public. If privacy is a concern, anonymizing the data should
be carried out carefully so as to not introduce artifacts (see Section 3.3 for a denition of
the term). If the dataset cannot be public, reproducing it must be possible.
(2) Interoperability — Network data needs to be shared using a common format. Although not
a standard, the most commonly used format is the PCAP le format.
(3) Good quality — rough our empirical experience of generating synthetic aacks, as well
as through the analysis of related work (see Section 3), we have identied diverse quality
issues that need to be taken into account when synthetic aacks are injected into real
trac. ese quality issues need to be addressed one by one, each one requiring special
aention. In Section 3, we further discuss these issues (termed artifacts) and categorize all
observations of these in other datasets.
2.2 Requirements for Injecting Synthetic Aacks
Tools for injecting synthetic aacks need to be built with the goal of crating useful datasets for
the evaluation of IDSs. ese tools must be capable of working with arbitrary PCAP les; the
de facto standard for recording and sharing network communications. ere should be no hard
assumptions regarding the provenance of these les nor how they are generated. It is for this
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reason that considerable care needs to be taken when designing a tool that injects synthetic aacks
into PCAP les.
2.2.1 Functional Requirements. e following functional requirements have been derived from
observations of how datasets are manually created. To alleviate the manual task of creating tailor-
made labeled datasets with aacks, a tool that injects aacks needs to take several functional
requirements into account. ese next requirements focus on conferring tools with the ability to
customize already existing aacks and create new ones without much additional eort.
(1) Packet level injection — In order to evaluate any type of network IDS, aacks must be
injected at the lowest common denominator that all network IDSs can use, i.e., packets.
Many IDSs directly use packets to perform intrusion detection. ere is, however, another
family of IDSs that work on higher abstraction levels, such as network ows [3]. If aacks
are injected at the packet level, both types of IDSs can benet from the generated datasets.
(2) erying interface for network properties — In order the generate realistic-looking syn-
thetic aacks, an input PCAP le needs to be analyzed to extract properties. ese properties
amount to quantitative characteristics such as average used bandwidth per host, total number
of packets sent by a specic host, or the open ports observed for a given subnetwork. ese
properties need to be made available to users that wish to inject aacks as well as to the
program that creates the synthetic aacks. An API is required to directly query the input
les into which aacks will be injected. is enables, for example, a synthetic port scan to
determine which ports, for a given host, were open in the input PCAP le.
(3) Aack diversity — Many network aack classications exist. ese classications should
be taken into account when providing tools for generating and injecting synthetic aacks.
Rather than only focusing on a single type of aack, creating a diverse set of aacks is
required.
(4) Applicability to arbitrary PCAP les — As long as a PCAP le contains network trac
alone, the le should be suitable for injecting synthetic aacks. To achieve this requirement,
PCAP les need to be analyzed to replicate their properties onto injected aacks. For
instance, if a network only contains local trac (from the 192.168.1.0 subnet), by default
aacks should not originate from IP addresses outside this subnet (unless this is desired
and manually congured).
(5) Headless operation — Working with arbitrary PCAP les implies that their size is unbounded.
Packet captures of crowded networks can easily reach a size of hundreds of gigabytes.
Analyzing and injecting aacks into these les might take considerable time and memory
resources. It is assumed, therefore, that cluster environments or headless systems are used
to process large les. For this reason, tools that inject aacks need to work in headless
environments with small or no user interaction.
(6) Modeling of packet behavior and payload — Aack injection tools need to model aacks at
the packet and payload levels. Aacks at the packet level are more concerned about the
quantity of the sent packets rather than on the payload. Port scans and DDoS (Distributed
Denial of Service) aacks are examples of these. In contrast, aacks at the payload level
may carefully cra the data sent by each packet. Exploit aacks against a web server are
examples of these. Some aacks are concerned with both levels, such as when creating
synthetic botnet generated trac. is trac sometimes contains important payload
information that denes the aack, other times, the trac is used as a DDoS aack in
which the payload is not important.
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2.2.2 Non-Functional Requirements. e following non-functional requirements are needed to
enable synthetic aack injection tools to process arbitrary PCAP les. e main challenge when
not being limited to certain PCAP les is to consider the dierent scenarios from where these
les may originate. Home and oce environments generate limited trac belonging to only few
sub-networks. In contrast, large enterprise or university networks may generate massive quantities
of data with heterogeneous characteristics.
(1) Scalability — When mimicking the properties of network data onto a synthetic aack, many
dierent statistics need to be collected. Calculating statistics on top of network data is
typically demanding both in terms of memory and processing resources. Tools that inject
synthetic aacks need to take this into account and calculate statistics as eciently as
possible. is guarantees the scalability of the tool when large PCAP les are analyzed and
injected with synthetic aacks.
(2) Extensibility — New aacks are developed each day. A set of tools and libraries are needed
to easily and rapidly model these new aacks for injection.
(3) Usability — One of the main reasons static datasets are widely used is due to their ease of use.
Static datasets have many disadvantages: they never change and become easily outdated.
eir advantages, however, outweigh the disadvantages: they can be used immediately
without extensive setup. Tools that generate either real or synthetic trac oen require
complicated hardware and setups. To be as useful as static datasets, tools that inject
synthetic aacks need to be usable. e user should be involved as lile as possible in the
injection process but have a detailed control over the injections.
(4) Open source and public availability — Researchers oen build custom tools to evaluate
their work without making the tools available in open platforms. It is also common that
tools are lost when researchers change subject areas or institutions. For example, the tools
proposed by Shiravi et al. [29] and Brauckho et al. [4] can no longer be easily found online
although they used to be available.
3 RELATEDWORK AND DEFECT ANALYSIS
A good quality dataset is one that allows researchers to identify the ability of an IDS to detect
anomalies [3], preferably allowing to draw valid conclusions about the appropriateness of the IDS
(its eciency, accuracy, validity scope, etc). Although many of the available datasets nowadays
are valuable to the research community, they unfortunately fail to fulll all the requirements
proposed in Section 2. e existing datasets can be classied into two categories: static datasets
and dynamically generated datasets (see Figure 2 for a historical overview). In this section, rst, we
provide basic information about some of the most popular static datasets. Aerwards, we present a
description about the dynamically generated datasets. Lastly, this section discusses the deciencies
and artifacts that can be found in datasets.
3.1 Static Datasets
A static dataset is a dataset that was generated once during a limited period of time. Such a dataset
can be collected from a real-world network or it can be generated synthetically. Currently, there
are several static datasets available for IDS evaluation purposes. Unfortunately, research suggests
that these datasets are not adequate for mainly two reasons. First, many of them are out of date.
ey were created many years ago based on old versions of protocols, old applications, and aacks
that exploit old vulnerabilities. us, these datasets are not realistic datasets at the present time.
Second, these datasets contain many defects that indicate synthetic generation. In the following, we
briey discuss some well-known static datasets. It is worth to mention that similar datasets can be
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found in other elds, such as the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) eld, where building testbeds is
a challenging task [15, 31]. However, the testbeds in such elds are built under application-specic
conditions, and are therefore considered out of the scope of this article.
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Figure 2. A historical timeline overview of datasets intended for intrusion detection.
3.1.1 DARPA 99. e DARPA 99 is one of the most well-known datasets in the eld. In fact,
DARPA 99 is an upgraded version of the DARPA 98 dataset. e two datasets were collected during
two intrusion detection evaluations [9, 20]. A testbed was developed to generate normal and
malicious trac. e normal trac tended to be similar to that seen between a military base and
the Internet. A custom soware automaton was used to simulate hundreds of users running UNIX
applications. In DARPA 98, the included aacks cover four categories, namely, DoS, R2L (Remote to
Local), U2R (User to Root), and Surveillance/Probing. e trac was collected for seven weeks
with labeled aacks and two weeks with unlabeled aacks. In DARPA 99, Windows NT hosts were
included in the evaluation as victims and more aacks types were covered. e dataset consists of
two weeks of normal trac with no aacks, one week with a few labeled aacks, and two weeks
of unlabeled trac. DARPA 98 − 99 datasets were highly innovative for their time and had been
widely used for IDS evaluation. However, later on, several studies have marked these datasets as
unreliable due to a number of limitations and issues (see Section 3.3).
3.1.2 KDD 99. is dataset was created on the basis of the DARPA 98 during a competition
for network intrusion detectors [10]. KDD 99 contains data records, rather than packets, where
each record contains 31 features that describe a connection. A connection is a sequence of TCP
packets that ow between two dened IP addresses, under dened protocol and within dened
time interval. e raw data of DARPA 98 was used to extract seven million connection records. All
connections were labeled as either normal or malicious with one specic aack type. is dataset
was used heavily to evaluate IDSs at that time. Later on, several shortcomings in this dataset were
pointed out by various studies.
3.1.3 MAWI. e MAWI (Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) dataset corresponds
to a family of datasets that are collected from an operational testbed network, connecting Japanese
universities and research institutes with various networks all over the world [30]. e trac is
stored in the tcpdump raw format, so the header information is available and can be used for
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further analysis. However, for privacy reasons, IP addresses are scrambled and packets’ payloads
are removed. Unfortunately, MAWI datasets are not labeled, thus, there is no ground truth to be
used in IDS evaluation. Fontugne et al. [12] proposed a method to label the anomalies in a subset
of MAWI datasets. e labeled dataset is known as MAWILab dataset. e labels are obtained using
an advanced graph-based methodology that compares and combines several independent anomaly
detectors. e dataset is updated constantly to include new trac and anomalies from upcoming
applications. Nevertheless, as the detectors are anomaly-based, false positives are expected to be
present in the dataset.
3.1.4 NSL-KDD. Tavallaee et al. [32] conducted a statistical analysis on the KDD 99 dataset and
found two deciencies. First, more than 75% of the data records are duplicated, which makes the
learning algorithms less sensitive for infrequent records, which can be malicious. Second deciency
is the low level of diculty. Using typical classiers, the authors were able to label the dataset
correctly with an unreasonably high accuracy rate. In NSL-KDD, the duplicated records were
removed and the diculty level was increased by selecting records out of KDD 99 based on the
inverse of classication accuracy rate.
3.1.5 CDX. is dataset was collected from the CDX (Cyber Defense Exercise) 2009 competition
[28]. e knowledge about the locations of the defenders and the aackers in the network was used
to label the trac as normal or malicious. In contrast to the DARPA 98− 99, the CDX dataset is more
realistic, since it presents the live trac of real human activities. Nevertheless, the ratio between
the normal and malicious trac was almost equal, not representing real world observations. In
addition, the dataset has a small volume because of the limited duration of the competition. is is
problematic for anomaly detectors that require a long training period.
3.1.6 Other Datasets. In the following, we briey discuss other IDS public datasets. An overview
of static datasets and their properties can be found in Table 1 [2, 18, 28, 29, 38].
• CAIDA: CAIDA (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis) collects data at
dierent locations, and provides this data to the research community, taking into account
the privacy of individuals and organizations who participate in generating the data [5].
• LBNL: LBNL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) collected packet traces for more
than 100 hours of internal enterprise trac, and released this data publicly in an anonymized
form [19].
• Simpleweb: A dataset was collected, Twente university network, via a honeypot in Sep-
tember 2008. Several network services were hosted on that honeypot, which was directly
connected to the Internet. e honeypot only captured suspicious trac [2].
• IMPACT: e IMPACT (Information Marketplace for Policy and Analysis of Cyber-risk
& Trust) project provides an open platform for dataset exchange. is platform connects
producers and consumers of cyber-risk-relevant data. e existing data was collected by
various organizations and universities [16].
• UMass Trace Repository: UMass university provides a trace repository that contains
network, storage, and other data traces. e data was extracted during various experiments
and hence is specialized; it reects specic network behavior and aacks that were captured
for experimental purposes [33].
• ADFA-LD: is dataset is provided by the university of New South Wale and consists of
normal and malicious Linux based system call traces. Only host logs had been collected
[14].
• IRSC: e dataset, created by the IRSC (Indian River State College), consists of packet
captures and network ow data and includes labels [38].
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• UNSW-NB15: is dataset contains real modern normal trac and synthetic aacks. It
was specically generated over a commercial penetration testing environment [14, 24].
Dataset Availability Synthetic Payload Groundtruth
Labeled
aacks Updates
DARPA 98-99 X X X X X x
KDD 99 X X X X X x
MAWILab X x x x X X
CAIDA X1 x X x x X
SimpleWeb X x x x x x
NSL-KDD X X X X X x
CDX x X X X X x
IMPACT X2 X x x x X
UMass X X3 X x x x
RIPE X4 x X5 x x X6
IRSC x X X X X x
UNSW-NB15 X X7 X X X x
1 Access to some datasets requires special permissions. 5 Not available in all datasets.
2 Access is limited to U.S. researchers. 6 Not updated regularly.
3 A variety of datasets, most of them synthetic. 7 Real benign trac and synthetic aacks.
4 Registration is required.
Table 1. Comparison of static datasets.
3.2 Dynamically Generated Datasets
Network behavior and trac paerns change continuously and aacks evolve rapidly. is created
a need for datasets that are modiable, extensible, and reproducible. erefore, researchers have
proposed tools that are capable of generating synthetic datasets dynamically. e main idea of
these tools is to consider the contemporary trac characteristics and replicate them in synthetic
trac, which in turn emphasizes the realism of the generated datasets. In this section, we present
the two existing dynamic datasets, followed by a brief comparison of them in Table 2.
3.2.1 FLAME. Bauckho et al. [4] proposed FLAME, an application that generates and injects
parameterized anomalies into a given ow trace. ree classes of anomalies are oered by FLAME: (i)
Additive anomalies where synthetic ows are added to a background trace, but without interacting
with the existing ows, e.g., network scans; (ii) Subtractive anomalies in which selected ows are
removed from background trac, e.g., ingress shis; (iii) Interactive anomalies where synthetic
ows are added to a background trace, and selected ows are removed, e.g., DoS aacks that cause
a network congestion. In particular, three use cases were implemented: a TCP SYN network scan,
ingress shiing, and TCP SYN DoS aack.
e usage of network ows, rather than payloads, as background trac makes datasets generated
by FLAME usable only for ow-based intrusion detection algorithms. In addition, many aacks
cannot be detected by only using network ows. In this context, FLAME is capable of creating a
limited range of aacks which have a ow footprint. Moreover, the implementation of FLAME is
not publicly available anymore due to its discontinuation.
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3.2.2 ISCX-UNB. Shiravi et al. [29] proposed a mechanism to generate dynamic datasets based
on the concept of proles (i.e., abstract representations of certain features and events in network
trac). Two classes of proles were proposed, namely, α and β . e α proles describe aack
behavior and are used to generate malicious trac. e β proles represent legitimate agents’
activities and are used to generate normal trac.
Real network trac was analyzed to extract mathematical distributions of various properties,
such as packet sizes, sizes of payloads, etc. ese distributions were encapsulated in β proles to
create models of normal trac. Several β proles were created to simulate dierent legitimate
agents that use various network protocols. e α proles were created manually based on human
knowledge. Each prole represents an aack scenario and a number of aacks were implemented.
A testbed network was built and a combination of α and β proles were executed to generate trac.
e quality, of the prole models in this work, however, raises questions. e β proles were
created based on real trac that was not veried to be free of aacks, and this degrades the
condence degree in the correctness of the proles. Moreover, human assistance is required to
execute α proles, which leads to variances on how aacks are carried out. us, the reproducibility
of the generated dataset is reduced. Lastly, the authors provide only the generated dataset to the
research community, but not the implemented proles.
Dataset Availability Synthetic Payload Groundtruth
Labeled
aacks
Tool
updates
FLAME x X x x1 X x
ISCX-UNB x2 X X X X x
1 Users are responsible for providing benign trac as an input.
2 One output dataset is available but not the tool.
Table 2. Comparison of dynamic datasets.
3.3 Defect Classification
In this section, we expose and categorize defects, that we as well as other researchers have detected.
ID2T actively tries to avoid commiing the same mistakes discovered in other datasets, either static
or dynamic. We use the term deciency to refer to a problem that appears in a static dataset. In
contrast, we use the term artifact to indicate a problem that has appeared as a side-eect of creating
synthetic network trac. Artifacts are associated to dynamic datasets only. Synthetic data is any
data that is not acquired through direct measurements [25]. In the context of networks, synthetic
data refers to network trac that is not captured directly from real-world networks, instead, it is
generated by soware to mimic real-world trac.
3.3.1 Categorization of Dataset Defects. We have categorized the dataset defects according
to Figure 3. Dataset defects can be divided in two classes, namely Invalid Network Trac and
Inconsistent Network Trac. Invalid Network Trac defects are problems that relate to the incorrect
usage of network protocols or specications. Inconsistent Network Trac defects are those
pertaining the creation of inadvertent trac paerns or network packets. ese two defect classes
are characterized by dierent symptoms depending on two dierent perspectives. From a Network
Biased Perspective, certain trac presents defects only when the background trac is taken into
account; otherwise, it looks normal. From a Network Agnostic Perspective, trac paerns present
defects regardless of the background trac. In the following, each piece of the classication is
explained and the defects found are classied.
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Figure 3. Categories of defects found in static or dynamic datasets.
(1) Invalid Network Trac: Trac paerns or individual packets that are invalid because
they contradict a network protocol specication. We encountered two reasons concerning
these class of defects, namely Invalid Data and Temporary Invalid Data.
(a) Invalid Data: Invalid trac according to a protocol specication. ese defects
have a slight change of meaning depending on the perspective. From a network
specic perspective, trac data in a dataset is invalid if the characteristics and physical
limitations of a network (captured by the dataset) are not respected. For example, if
packets have a larger MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) than what the network
hardware supports; also, if packets use more bandwidth than what is available. ese
two examples are cases of artifacts. From a network agnostic perspective, trac data
is invalid if protocols are violated that should or cannot be. For example, any TCP
packet using port zero.
(b) Temporary Invalid Data: Trac data that used to be valid according to an old
protocol but are not anymore. ese defects are only relevant when looked from a
network agnostic perspective. An example of such a defect is found in the DARPA 99
dataset [20]. Here, the IPv4 ToS (Type of Service) eld uses an old standard found in
RFC 791 [27]. e ToS eld has a dierent meaning according to the more recent RFC
3260 [13].
(2) Inconsistent Network Trac: Network trac that does not reect the same charac-
teristics of some background network trac. Inconsistencies can originate from wrong
assumptions of how a network behaves or unforeseen problems in the process of generating
synthetic trac.
(a) Articial Anomalies: Anomalous data paerns inadvertently added to network
traces. ese can result from either the generation of synthetic aacks or the incorrect
set-up of hardware. As an anomalous paern depends on the specic network, this
is a defect found only from a network biased perspective. For example, Mahoney et
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al. [21] were able to detect 33 aacks in the DARPA 99 dataset [20] due to the use of
the same TTL (Time To Live) values in the packets of all aacks.
(b) Predictable Patterns: Paerns that appear repeatedly such that network trac di-
versity is constricted, making the trac incorrectly correlate with bogus information.
ese defects are not expected in any network and are therefore taken into account
from a network agnostic perspective. As an example, Brauckho et al. [4] generated
synthetic SYN port scans with this defect. e authors, without knowing the repercus-
sion of doing so, used the same delay between the reply packets of the aack. is
led to a predictable paern of inter-arrival times that highly correlate with the aack.
Similarly, the DARPA 99 dataset [20] utilized TTL values with only nine dierent values
across the entire dataset, making some values highly correlate with the aacks alone.
(c) Unrealistic Cleanness: An excessively clean dataset can be a sign of network trac
that does not have the characteristics of real-world network trac. Most networks
will periodically observe issues such as incorrect packet checksums or TCP packet
retransmissions and duplication. From a network agnostic perspective, a complete
lack of these issues signals a dataset that does not conform to a real-world and live
network.
We now go on to describe our dataset generation framework followed by the tools and applications
of it.
4 THE INTRUSION DETECTION DATASET TOOLKIT (ID2T)
e ID2T (Intrusion Detection Dataset Toolkit) is soware that generates and injects synthetic
aacks into a PCAP le. e main aim of ID2T is to dynamically create high quality datasets for
IDS evaluation purposes. ID2T was designed to provide the research community with datasets that
meet the aforementioned requirements of IDS datasets (see Section 2.1). At a glance, ID2T takes a
PCAP le as input and provides a new PCAP le as output; the laer contains the original input
trac along with synthetic aacks.
e main architecture of ID2T was presented in [7, 35]. In this work, we extend theAacks module
to include a wider range of aacks. Generating additional aacks with dierent characteristics
requires considering further statistical properties of the background trac, therefore, we extend
as well the Statistics module to cover this aspect. In addition, we develop a new module TIDED,
which analyzes the input trac properties in order to indicate potential problems. In this section,
we provide a detailed description of ID2T and its extended architecture.
4.1 ID2T Architecture
Figure 4, illustrates the architecture of ID2T in which arrows represent ow of data between the
computation modules. In the following, we describe in detail the architecture by rst focusing on
the input and the output of ID2T and subsequently on the core components of the system.
4.1.1 Input. ID2T receives two inputs from the user: a PCAP le and the aack parameters.
As mentioned in Section 1, the main assumption behind ID2T is that the user is responsible for
the input PCAP le. at is, the PCAP may or may not contain aack data. In both cases, the
toolkit replicates the input trac characteristics in the synthetic aacks. Hence, ID2T does not
examine the input for signs of aack data. It does, however, provide a test module that conducts a
quantitative analysis of the input PCAP le. is analysis produces several statistical properties,
which can be used to infer potential problems in the input trac (e.g., incorrect TCP checksums or
unexpected values in packet headers). e second input is the aack parameters, which specify
the properties of the synthetic aack. Examples of such parameters can be the IP addresses of the
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Figure 4. An overview of the ID2T architecture
aacker and the victim, the utilized ports, and the location in which the aack will be injected in
the input trac.
4.1.2 Output. As depicted in Figure 4, the output of the system is threefold. First, ID2T creates
a PCAP le that includes the input trac along with the synthetic aacks. Second, the toolkit can
(optionally) perform a multitude of statistical tests to explore the characteristics of the input trac.
e results of the tests are presented in a set of graphs and a text le denoted ”TIDED report” in
Figure 4. Finally, ID2T generates a labels le that contains information about the injected aacks
and their locations in the output PCAP le.
4.1.3 ID2T-Modules. In the following, we present the core modules of the system, namely the
Coordinator, the Statistics, the Aack Controller, the Merger, the Aack Labeling and TIDED.
Coordinator. is module initiates the process, triggers other modules, and passes them the
required parameters. More specically, the Coordinator receives the path of the input PCAP le
and the aack parameters from the user, and forwards these two inputs to the Statistics and the
Aack Controller modules, respectively.
Statistics. is module collects statistical properties of the input PCAP le. e module is also
responsible for calculating the hash 2 of the input PCAP, which is used to check whether the le
was previously loaded and analyzed. In this case, the recalculation of the le’s properties is not
required. Otherwise, the Statistics module analyzes the packets of the le sequentially and collects
four types of features.
First, properties of the le as a whole are collected and taken into account; these can be features
such as the total packet count, the capture duration and the average packet size. Second, properties
that relate to each host in the network, such as the sent and received packets are determined. ird,
2SHA-224 hash function
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the distribution of some header elds, e.g., the protocols, the ports , the TTLs, and the window sizes
are calculated. Finally, features with regard to the TCP connections, such as the average packet
rate and the packet inter-arrival time are taken into account. e aforementioned properties are
mainly used by the Aack Controller module to guarantee that the synthetic aacks exhibit similar
characteristics to the input trac when this is expected from an aack that would be created in
real world. In addition, the statistical properties provide the main input for the trac analysis that
is conducted by the TIDED module.
Aack Controller. e main tasks of this module is to validate the aack parameters provided by
the user, and to call the corresponding Aacks module to generate the synthetic aack. e Aack
Controller module provides the Aacks module with the statistical properties of the input PCAP
le. Aerwards, it produces a temporary PCAP le that contains the generated aack.
Aacks. is module contains the aacks that ID2T can generate and inject. is module was
designed to be extensible, in the sense that a user can implement and add their own aacks.
Currently, the module contains four classes of aacks, namely, probing and surveillance, exploits,
resource exhaustion, and botnet infection. For each aack, this module receives and processes a
dierent set of parameters and, in some case, additional input les. An in-depth discussion of the
aacks that are supported by ID2T is given in Section 6.
Merger. Aer generating a temporary aack PCAP le by the Aack Controller module, the
Merger module injects the aacks by merging that le with the input PCAP le according to the
timestamps of the packets.
Aack Labeling. e task of this module is to create a le that contains labels of the injected
aacks. e Aack Controller module sends information about the injected aacks to the Aack
Labeling module, which in turn writes it in XML format into a text le. e information includes
the names of the aacks and the timestamps where they start and end in the output PCAP le.
TIDED. is module provides users with a quantitative analysis of the input trac characteristics.
A detailed description of the TIDED module is given in Section 5.
4.2 Modules’ Performance
is section presents an overview of the performance of two modules, namely, the statistics and the
aacks modules. Our experiments show that the ability of these modules to generate the internal
data needed for ID2T is acceptable from a timing perspective, meaning that no bolenecks have so
far been discovered in running the modules when feeding each other with data. In the following,
we show two charts: the statistics generation performance indicator, and the DDoS aack data
creation indicator.
a) Generation of Statistics: One of our proposed requirements (see Section 2) is the ability to
handle arbitrary les. Hence, it is important to examine how ID2T’s architecture handles large les.
e only boleneck to take into account, for handling large les, is located in the statistics module.
Figure 5 shows the time required to handle les of dierent sizes. e PCAP les utilized in the
experiment are from the MAWI archives 3. In particular, four dierent les are examined, ranging
from approximately 11 million to 212 million packets. For each le, two dierent measurements were
examined. First, for collecting the so-called regular statistics, which encompass the features that
were presented in the Statistics module description. Second, measurements are taken for further
data analysis. ese extra tests include, but are not limited to, calculating IP addresses’ entropies,
3hp://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/samplepoint-F/2015/201506021400.html
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examining the correctness of TCP checksums, and checking the availability of packet payloads.
ese tests are parts of the TIDED module, and are further explained in Section 5. At a glance,
Figure 5 suggests that moderate network les, e.g., a 14GB PCAP le, can be analyzed by ID2T in a
reasonable time frame.
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Figure 5. Performance of collecting statistics
b) DDoS Aack Creation: e toolkit provides aacks such as DDoS aack, which usually
produces a large number of packets. erefore, the performance of generating packets is important
for such toolkit. Figure 6 shows the results of several performance experiments with regard to the
time needed to generate 104, 105, and 106 packets of a DDoS aack. Although the experiments show
that the time increases exponentially, it is illustrated that ID2T is able to generate a big number of
packets in a reasonable amount of time.
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Figure 6. Performance of creating DDoS aack packets
5 TESTING INTRUSION DETECTION DATASETS (TIDED)
Datasets are needed to accurately evaluate the detection capabilities of NIDSs. For evaluations
to be accurate and unbiased, datasets need to satisfy the requirements presented in Section 2.1.
If these requirements are not satised, NIDSs might detect or learn articial paerns that do not
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typically occur in networks. And while most requirements are easily veried, the Good ality
non-functional requirement is of a more complex nature. In order to analyze datasets to identify
potential quality problems, we have developed the ID2T module named TIDED. e goal of TIDED
is to identify potential sources of artifacts (synthetic defects, see Section 3.3), inherent deciencies
of the background trac (a user dened PCAP le), or both.
ere are two sources of artifacts or deciencies that contribute to the fallibility of a dataset
when evaluating NIDSs. e tools that inject synthetic aacks or manipulate trac are the rst
source. e second source is the dataset itself and the environment where it is generated. ID2T
actively avoids creating artifacts throughout the process of injecting synthetic aacks. In spite of
these eorts, it is still possible that, aer using ID2T, a generated dataset is unsuitable for evaluation
because of its own inherent or unforeseen issues.
In the past, many datasets have been found to contain inadvertent artifacts or deciencies. e
well known DARPA 1999 dataset [9], for example, uses a limited set of TTL values in all TCP
headers. Unknowingly, aacks use TTL values that background trac does not use, making aacks
easy to identify. e FLAME [4] tool injects synthetic aacks at the ow level. Each synthetic ow
is injected with a predictable delay, making the synthetic ows easy to uncover. In Section 3.3, a
classication of artifacts is presented with more examples like these.
TIDED tests the reliability of any network capture le (in the PCAP format). is module focuses
on nding abnormal statistical properties that might point to artifacts or defects that contradict
the dataset’s requirements. A set of statistical tests are run on top of a dataset. e results of
these tests have a twofold use. On the one hand, they are used to measure and validate certain
metrics belonging to the network’s background trac. On the other hand, the reliability tests are
put at the disposal of ID2T’s aack controller (see Figure 4). is enables the aacks to rene the
parameters used by aacks to beer replicate the network’s background trac. With this module,
ID2T becomes not only an aack injection tool, but also a network dataset analysis tool.
5.1 Test Categories
e statistical tests performed by TIDED can be categorized as shown in Figure 7. Availability Tests
refer to those that verify the availability of packets’ payloads. Validity Tests look for either TCP
checksum problems, or invalid and uncommon ports. e port validity tests report the usage of
standard but unassigned ports (in accordance to IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority))
and how many times port 0 is used. Diversity Tests use a set of metrics (see Section 5.2) to present
information related to the packets’ header elds. With this set of metrics, we quantitatively qualify
an analyzed network. is enables us to identify potential problems when certain qualities do not
meet expectations. For example, if the analyzed trac comes from a supposedly backbone network
and the entropy of source IP addresses is below a threshold, there is evidence to suspect that the
trac is not from the claimed source. In the following, the tests are discussed in more detail.
5.1.1 Availability Tests.
Payload availability. e ratio of packets with data payload against those without. A dataset
without data payloads cannot be used by all NIDSs. erefore, this information is needed to
determine if a dataset is suitable only in restricted evaluation scenarios.
5.1.2 Validity Tests.
TCP Checksums. e ratio of wrong TCP checksums against correct ones. is test helps to
detect synthetic datasets that have not correctly generated the network packets. It can also identify
networks with faulty hardware, tools with inadequate anonymizing mechanisms or packet capturing
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Figure 7. The categories into which the statistical tests performed by the TIDED module are divided.
tools with deciencies. In [23], for example, aacks could be identied based on incorrect packet
checksums. We note that the complete absence of incorrect checksums is potentially an artifact or
defect. Real trac usually contains small quantities of network packets with incorrect checksums.
Port Validity. e counts of port numbers used in each of the three port ranges dened by IANA
in RFC 1340 [17] and RFC 6335 [8]. As a special case, the test reports the number of times packets
targeted port zero. In the popular Berkeley sockets API, port zero indicates that a random port
should be utilized. In wrong implementations or incorrectly generated synthetic aacks, zero is
used as a port. Real networks seldom observe packets directed towards port zero.
5.1.3 Diversity Tests. e following tests use various metrics, which will be explained on the
next section.
IP Diversity. e goal here is to quantitatively characterize the diversity of source and destination
IP addresses . e IP address diversity correlates with the network type (home, oce, backbone,
industrial control, etc.). A combination with the knowledge of the network type enables an analyst
to identify potential issues.
TTL Diversity. is aims to characterize the diversity of the TTL values of all network packets.
Dierent sources alter the TTL value of the packets, for example, dierent operating systems use
dierent initial TTL values and networking devices (e.g., routers, switches, etc.) alter these. e
diversity of this eld correlates with the diversity of the packets’ sources and networking devices.
MSS (Maximum Segment Size) Diversity. e distribution of all observed MSS values within a
PCAP le. Although MSS values tend to remain constant in most packets, certain hosts choose
to increase it to maximize their throughput. Conversely, a host may choose to lower the MSS to
reduce IP fragmentation. e distribution of the MSS may correlate with a network’s design (e.g.,
data or resource sharing, providing services, cloud computing, etc.).
Window Size Diversity. is shows the changing behavior of the window sizes of network packets.
When troubleshooting network problems, the window size is oen a key indicator to examine.
Additionally, networks aached to dierent systems (e.g., workstations, clusters, grids, etc.), benet
from tuning the window sizes [11].
ToS Diversity. is relates to the evolution of the ToS TCP values. e meaning of the ToS header
eld, originally dened in RFC791, has gone through ve dierent denitions until its current
denition, as dened in RFC2474. erefore, the diversity of this eld lets an analyst identify the
year and version of the used TCP standard.
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5.2 Diversity Test Metrics
With the help of a few metrics, an analyst may quantify and characterize key aspects of a network
PCAP le. ID2T is also able to use these metrics to create aacks that beer replicate the input
trac. To express diversity, we use several metrics and graphs.
5.2.1 (Shannon) Entropy distribution. We use entropy to characterize the uncertainty of observ-
ing a particular feature within a time window. Entropy is calculated as:
H (X ) = −
n∑
i=1
P (xi ) · log2 P (xi ), (1)
where X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn } and P (X ) is the probability mass function of X . e minimum entropy
value is zero and the maximum is log2 n, where n is the total number of elements ‖X ‖. Low entropy
signals that some feature values rarely change within a time window; that is, the values of the feature
are predictable. High entropy indicates that dierent values of the same feature are repeatedly
seen; the predictability of such a feature is low. In Figure 8, we exemplify this metric by showing
the entropy of the source IP addresses of all packets seen in a PCAP le of the MAWI dataset (see
Section 3.1.3 for a description of the MAWI dataset). e le is analyzed in 100 intervals. It can
be observed that in the rst quarter of the capture, the trac is highly irregular. Aerwards, the
trac seles and the observed source IP addresses are less randomly encountered.
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Figure 8. Example entropy graph of all the observed source IPs in a network PCAP file.
5.2.2 Normalized (Shannon) entropy. e normalized entropy Hn (X ) is dened as the entropy
H (X ) divided by the maximum entropy value log2 n for n samples:
Hn (X ) = −
n∑
i=1
P (xi ) · log2 P (xi )
log2 n
. (2)
Normalized entropy lies in the range [0, 1]. Normalized entropy is used when comparing two
random variables that have dierent number of samples n. Figure 9 compares six dierent properties
belonging to eight dierent datasets. e DARPA1 and DARPA2 bars correspond to two dierent
PCAP les found in the DARPA dataset. Similarly, the MAWI1 and MAWI2 bars corresponds to
PCAP le from dierent days of the MAWI dataset.
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A few conclusions can be made from comparing the normalized entropy: e DARPA datasets
have considerably high ToS entropy which corresponds to the fact that DARPA was created when
the ToS eld was dened to have a dierent meaning than more modern datasets. e DARPA
dataset has deciencies in how window sizes are chosen. When contrasting the normalized entropy
of the window sizes, this deciency of the DARPA dataset becomes obvious (the window sizes
barely change due to how synthetic trac was generated [22]). e NGIDS-DS synthetic dataset
also has some potential issues when looking at the MSS, ToS and window size. Furthermore, from
the normalized entropy of the destination IP addresses, it can be seen that almost always the same
hosts are contacted; signaling a potential lack of network diversity. From the same perspective
of network diversity, the UNSW-NB almost always captures trac of hosts that are only seen
once. is is not an issue on itself. Depending on the purpose of the dataset, however, a high
diversity might reduce its usability (e.g., learning paerns of normality for detecting anomalous
host communications).
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Figure 9. Comparison of normalized entropies between dierent datasets.
5.2.3 Novelty distribution. Distribution of newly observed values at dierent time windows.
is metric partitions the dataset into time windows (x-axis). For each time window, the number of
values (y-axis) that have never seen in the previous time windows are displayed. Figures 10 and 11
show examples of this metric for dierent network features.
In Figure 10, the distribution of novel IP addresses of a day of the DARPA dataset are shown.
Aer time window 60, where each time window spans around 15 minutes, no new IP addresses are
seen again.
In Figure 11a and 11b, the novelty distribution of window sizes of two datasets can be compared.
In Figure 11a, we see that new window sizes in one day of the MAWI dataset are always recorded
(in diminishing counts). is is consistent with the fact that MAWI has data of a backbone network.
In contrast, Figure 11b shows that only in few time windows new values of window sizes are
observed. is points to a potential dataset defect: this is not expected given that the UMSW-NB
dataset is supposed to contain real network trac with injected aacks for the evaluation of NIDS.
5.2.4 (Normalized) Entropy of novelty distribution. e (normalized) entropy pertaining to a
specic network feature as found in the entire dataset. Entropy is not only used for determining
the predictability of a random variable, it is also used to characterize the shape of a distribution.
is metric provides a quantitative measurement that provides a graphical representation as well
as the means to compare dierent datasets.
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Figure 10. Novelty distribution of IPs of one day of the DARPA dataset. Halfway though the day, no records
of new IP addresses are observed.
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(a)Novelty distribution of window sizes
of a day of the MAWI dataset.
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(b)Novelty distribution of window sizes
of a day of the UNSW dataset.
Figure 11. Example plots of the novelty distribution metric.
Figure 12 shows a comparison of the normalized entropy of dierent network features as found
in dierent datasets. From the gure, it is possible to see that the ToS, TTL and MSS header elds
of the DARPA dataset (DARPA1 and DARPA2) have seen a low number of novel values due to
their low entropy. e same is true for the UNSW-NB dataset, with the addition that the window
sizes and IP addresses have this same property. Due to the nature of the dataset, this is a potential
issue. e MAWI (from two distinct days, MAWI1 and MAWI2) and Simpleweb datasets can also be
assessed from the plot. Namely, these datasets record trac from large networks and, therefore,
never cease to observe new IP addresses (along with dierent window sizes, presumably due to
congestion prevention mechanisms).
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Figure 12. Comparison of the normalized entropies of the distribution of novel values between dierent
datasets.
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Figure 13. Cumulative entropy of a day in the DARPA dataset for the IP sources.
5.2.5 Cumulative (Shannon) entropy distribution. e cumulative entropy of a dataset at dierent
time windows. At each time window, all previous time windows are used to calculate a feature’s
entropy. is metric enables an analyst to identify unexpected entropy gains (or losses).
Figure 13 shows the source IP cumulative entropy of one day of the DARPA dataset. is plot
is an alternative view of the entropy distribution plot (cf. Figure 8). In this example, we observe
how no new source IP addresses are observed in one of the days of the DARPA dataset aer time
interval 60.
6 SYNTHETIC ID2T ATTACKS
ID2T puts several synthetic aacks at the disposal of the NIDS community. Figure 14, presents a
classication of the aacks that are currently supported by ID2T. Each aack aempts to create
synthetic trac that replicates, whenever possible and desirable, the conditions of some background
network trac. For example, ID2T replicates the distributions of various header elds’ values, such
as the TTL, MSS, and window size. Moreover, the rate of the injected packets is calculated in a
way that considers the changes of the background trac intensity, i.e., high trac intensity leads
to extra latency, thus, the packets are injected at a lower rate. Users can provide ID2T with a set
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of parameters to adjust the generated aack. ese parameters vary from one aack to another.
If the user does not provide the required parameters, ID2T uses the statistical properties of the
background trac to select proper values automatically. In addition, ID2T considers the behavior
of real-world tools, e.g., Nmap and Metasploit, that are commonly used to perform such aacks. In
the following subsections, we will describe the categories of aacks in Figure 14 in more detail.
Network-related
Attacks
Probing and
Surveillance  ExploitationResource Exhaustion Botnet Infection
Port Scan EternalBlueExploit
Joomla Exploit
SQL Injection
Attack
SYN Flood
DDoS
Sality Botnet
Infection
FTPWinaXe
Exploit
SMBLoris
Attack
SMB Scan P2P BotnetCommunication 
MS17 Scan
Memcrashed
Figure 14. Classification and aacks provided by ID2T.
6.1 Probe and Surveillance
is class contains scan techniques which aim at collecting information about networks or hosts,
usually, with the intention of preparing for further aacks. In ID2T, three scans are provided as
follows.
6.1.1 Port Scan. A port scan is a reconnaissance technique used to discover vulnerabilities in
network hosts by sending port probes. In ID2T, a vertical TCP SYN port scan is implemented. is
scan targets various ports on a single host by sending SYN packets. ID2T generates three types of
packets, namely SYN, SYN+ACK, and RST. Furthermore, ID2T imitates the behavior of an Nmap
(default) scan with regard to the targeted ports; that is, the Nmap-service table is used to select
the most common 1000 open TCP ports. Nmap utilizes an adaptive packet rate technique, in which
the packet rate corresponds to the changes of the background trac intensity. ID2T replicates
this behavior. In particular, this was implemented by using the complementary packet rate of the
background trac aer normalizing it to a user-selected value. Figure 15a, shows the intervals of
the packet rate of an arbitrary PCAP le used as background trac, while Figure 15b, depicts the
complementary packet rate normalized to 1000 packets per second, which is used for the injected
packets rate.
6.1.2 SMB Scan. is aack scans a network for SMB (Server Message Block) servers. In
particular, the aacker aempts to establish TCP connections with the victim(s) on the port 445.
If the connection is established successfully, an SMB negotiation starts and more packets are
exchanged, where the aacker can learn more about the service provided by the victim (e.g.,
the version of SMB). ID2T simulates this scan by generating and injecting the packets of TCP
connections and SMB negotiations.
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Figure 15. Packet rate of an arbitrary PCAP file and an injected aack.
6.1.3 MS17 Scan. is specialized scan examines whether a victim has the MS17-010 patch. is
patch resolves several vulnerabilities in the implementation of SMBv1 in MS Windows OS. One of
these vulnerabilities was used by the EternalBlue exploit. In Metasploit, the module smb ms17 010
4 performs this scan. ID2T utilizes the packets of the smb ms17 010 module as templates. It then
injects these packets into the input PCAP le aer manipulating them to replicate the properties of
the background trac.
6.1.4 Probing limitations. During probe activities, aackers receive responses from the victims
and these responses are used to derive information about the victim. ID2T provides a limited
version of these responses. For example, in a real-world port scan, the response packets can be
SYN+ACK, RST, or ICMP unreachable error packets. In ID2T, we consider one response packet
type, which is the SYN+ACK packet. However, detecting probe scans depends mainly on the trac
generated by the aackers. erefore, the packets injected by ID2T are sucient to evaluate IDSs
against these scans.
6.2 Resource Exhaustion
e aacks in this class aim to use up the resources of networks or hosts, to deny legitimate users
access a particular service. ID2T provides two aacks under this class, namely, SYN Flood DDoS
and Memcrashed.
6.2.1 SYN Flood DDoS Aack. In this aack, a multitude of machines establish a massive amount
of TCP connections with a victim to use up its resources. ID2T creates this aack by generating
two types of packets: SYN packets, which are sent by the aackers, and SYN+ACK packets, which
are sent by the victim. Known aspects from the victim previous activities in the background trac
are taken into account; rst, to determine which (open) ports to aack, and second, to estimate the
packet rate that is sucient to bring the host down. Moreover, ID2T imitates some of the properties
of Metasploit DoS aack’s packets; for instance, the random window size.
6.2.2 Memcrashed Aack. is is an amplication aack that exploits a vulnerability5 in Mem-
cached6 servers, where an aacker sends forged UDP requests with a spoofed targeted source IP to
4hps://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb ms17 010.rb
5CVE-2018-1000115
6Distributed memory caching system used to speed up dynamic web applications.
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servers. e servers send back responses to the targeted source IP, overwhelming its resources.
Currently, ID2T injects only the rst part of this aack, i.e. the packets sent from the aacker to
the Memcached servers.
6.2.3 Resource exhaustion limitations. In real-world networks, resource exhaustion aacks leave
usually remarkable impacts on the targeted networks and hosts, such as increasing the response
time of the victim and creating network congestions, thus, increasing the network latency and
causing packet loss. Replicating such impacts requires modication in the background trac, e.g.,
by deleting packets, which is not considered currently in ID2T. However, the resource exhaustion
aacks are usually recognizable by NIDSs based on the suspicious trac generated by aackers,
rather than the implications on the normal trac. us, ID2T datasets can be used eectively to
evaluate NIDSs against these aacks.
6.3 Exploitation
ese aacks target an existing bug or vulnerability in a system with the intention of gaining
control, privilege escalation, or denying a service. Five dierent exploits are available in ID2T.
6.3.1 EternalBlue Exploit. is exploit targets a buer overow vulnerability7 in the SMBv1
in MS Windows OS. e Metasploit module eternalblue doublepulsar8 performs this aack. ID2T
injects the packets generated by this module aer manipulating the header elds, while maintaining
the payload since it contains the malicious code. During this aack, several TCP connections are
established. ID2T takes into account preserving the conditions of these connections with regard to
the order, overlap, and dependency.
6.3.2 FTPWinaXe Exploit. In this aack, a malicious FTP server sends packets with overly long
payloads to a WinaXe 7.7 9 FTP client, exploiting a buer overow vulnerability. A user can provide
the payloads as input, otherwise ID2T generates random ones.
6.3.3 Joomla Privilege Escalation Exploit. is exploit uses a vulnerability10 found in Joomla11
versions 3.4.4 through 3.6.3. e vulnerability allows aackers to create an arbitrary account with ad-
ministrative privileges. ID2T uses template packets obtained from the Metasploit joomla registration
privesc module12. In this aack, ID2T manipulates the packets’ header elds and the HTTP headers
of the payload.
6.3.4 SMBLoris Aack. is aack exploits a vulnerability in the SMB protocol that allows an
aacker to make large memory allocations without being authenticated. ID2T creates this aack by
targeting the SMB port of the victim with NBT (NetBIOS over TCP) packets that have the maximum
value in the length eld.
6.3.5 SQL Injection Aack. is aack targets a vulnerability13 found in ATutor 2.2.1 14 appli-
cations. e vulnerability allows aackers to inject SQL statements, bypass authentication, and
gain administrator privileges. Metasploit atutor sqli module performs this aack. ID2T injects the
7CVE-2017-0144
8hps://github.com/ElevenPaths/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit
9An X Windows environment, enables dierent OSs and their applications to be connected through SSH, TCP/IP, NFS, FTP,
TFTP and Telnet.
10CVE-2016-8870
11Content management system for web applications.
12hps://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/admin/hp/joomla registration privesc
13CVE-2016-2555
14Content management system for education purposes.
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packets of this module aer modifying them to adapt with the background trac characteristics
and the user parameters.
6.3.6 Exploitation limitations. is class of aacks are mainly distinguished by the packet
payload, where the exploit is located. ID2T eectively mimics such aacks by copying real malicious
payloads. However, ID2T is limited to producing specic versions of these aacks. For example, in
real-world EternalBlue, the number of connections can vary based on the victim’s resources, while
in ID2T, a xed number of connections is generated.
6.4 Botnet Infection
A botnet is a set of network-connected compromised machines that work in a coordinated fashion
for malicious purposes, such as email spam delivery and performing DDoS aacks. ID2T provides
the ability to inject two types of botnet trac: a variant of Sality botnet and user-dened botnet
communication paerns.
6.4.1 Sality Botnet. Sality is a classication of malicious programs that infect executable les in
MS Windows OS. Over time, Sality programs were developed to contain a variety of abilities, such as
exltrating sensitive data. e Sality variant that is supported in ID2T is known as Win32-Sality.AM.
It loads a malicious DLL le in the memory of the infected host. ID2T injects the trac of this
botnet, which was obtained from VirusTotal.com, aer modifying the packet headers and the packet
rate.
6.4.2 P2P Botnet Communication. ID2T is also able to generate P2P botnet communication
trac. A user needs to provide ID2T with a specication of the aack, namely, a CSV (Comma
Separated Values) le, where the interactions and type of messages exchanged between bots are
specied. e Aacks module in ID2T handles this le and generates the botnet trac based on its
content. ID2T can either add this trac to existing hosts in the input PCAP or generate new hosts
acting as the bots.
6.4.3 Botnet infection limitations. In the ID2T version of the Sality botnet, a xed set of malicious
IP addresses is currently used. In real-world, these addresses can be more diverse and can be changed
dynamically. However, NIDSs can detect the Sality botnet trac not just based on the malicious IP
addresses, but also based on footprints in the HTTP headers, which are replicated by ID2T.
7 USE CASES: APPLICATIONS OF ID2T
In this chapter, we demonstrate how ID2T can be applied to determine the detection capabilities
of dierent IDSs using replicable datasets. We illustrate this with two use cases. In the rst use
case, we inject aacks into a publicly available PCAP le and use an anomaly detection IDS to
demonstrate the detection capabilities of the system. In the second use case, we use publicly
available signature-based IDSs to demonstrate that the synthetic aacks injected by ID2T are
indeed triggering expected signatures. erefore, assessing whether the signature-based IDS is
working as intended. ese use cases show how ID2T can be used to compare or test existing
systems with datasets that can be replicated.
7.1 Assessing Anomaly Detection Capabilities
As a rst use case, we use ID2T to demonstrate the detection capabilities of an anomaly-based
NIDS in a backbone network scenario. For such demonstration, we need a labeled PCAP of
backbone trac that contains the aack we wish to detect. e MAWI dataset [12] provides good
candidate PCAPs that include labels. Nonetheless, the provided labels do not reect the ground
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truth concerning the network trac stored in the PCAPs. e labels mark anomalous trac in
accordance to three dierent anomaly detectors. To determine the type of aacks, a heuristic is
used. Because no human is involved in the labeling process, the accuracy of the labels cannot be
guaranteed. Furthermore, due to the amount of network trac, it is also unfeasible to assess if
there are other unlabeled aacks. With ID2T, we can inject precise aacks into sanitized MAWI
PCAPs les (e.g. removing trac labeled as anomalous) to determine if an IDS can at least detect
the injected aacks. is approach enables us to test the detection accuracy (and precision) of an
IDS against a specic set of chosen aacks.
We demonstrate the detection capabilities of an anomaly detection methodology that uses shallow
autoencoders, also known as RNNs (Replicator Neural Networks) [6]. e demonstration, however,
is applicable to any other anomaly-based NIDS. RNNs learn how the entropies of trac features
behave within a time window. When testing for anomalies within a time window, the RNN assigns
an anomaly score to the network trac based on what it learned. It is assumed that trac that
does not conform to the learned behavior will yield higher anomaly scores in contrast to benign
trac. When the anomaly score passes a threshold determined by the model, an anomaly is raised
(signaling a potential aack).
We use four days (from 2018/04/01 to 2018/04/04) of backbone network trac of the MAWI
dataset to train, inject and detect port scans and DDoS aacks using an RNN. We choose these two
aacks as these are expected to leave distinguishable network ngerprints that an anomaly detector
should identify. Each day of the MAWI dataset consists of 15 minutes of trac. We processed each
day using a three step process. First, we split each day in time windows of 10 seconds. Second,
we convert all trac within a time window into network ows. e resulting ows are sanitized
by removing those marked as anomalous by the labels provided by the MAWI dataset. Finally, we
calculate the entropy of source and destination IPs and ports (for a total of four entropies) of all
ows (see [6] for more details). e set of entropies belonging to the time windows of the rst
three days are used to train an RNN. e last day is used for testing purposes.
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Figure 16. Anomaly scores given to four dierent days of the MAWILab dataset by an RNN. The first three
days are used to train the model. The fourth day is used to test the trained model.
Figure 16 shows the anomaly scores of the training and testing days as given by the trained
RNN. e x-axis shows the dierent time windows into which a single day is split (15 minutes ×
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60 seconds = 90 time windows). e y-axis shows the anomaly score of the entropies calculated
at each time window. e RNN uses the rst three days for training and is, therefore, expected
to yield low anomaly scores for these training days. is is generally the case except for two
instances within the third day (at time window 85 and 90). Aer manually examining those time
windows, we identied that both spikes in the anomaly score correspond to an irregular amount
of observed source ports (the entropy of the source ports more than doubled). By removing the
outliers, the mechanism established an anomaly score threshold of 1.5. at is, any time window
with an anomaly score above the dashed line is considered to have experienced anomalous trac.
7.1.1 Detecting DDoS Aacks. We proceed to inject DDoS aacks (see Section 6.2.1) of dierent
intensities into the testing day and use a RNN to detect the aacks. Figure 17 shows the resulting
anomaly scores of the testing day with three dierent DDoS intensities. All aacks are injected
into a clean testing day (aacks are not stacked) at time window 30. All aacks last a total of one
minute (until time window 36). e upper le plot, shows the anomaly scores of the testing day
with no injected aacks for reference. e upper right plot shows a 3,000 packets per second DDoS
aack. e boom le plot shows a 6,000 packets per second DDoS aack. e plot to the boom
right shows a high intensity DDoS aack of 10,000 packets per second. e PCAP le of the testing
day contains 78 million packets. e percentage of packets added to the PCAP is, from the low to
high intensity aacks, 0.23, 0.46 and 0.77 percent, respectively.
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Figure 17. Detecting dierent DDoS aacks injected with ID2T using anomaly detection.
From Figure 17, we observe that the injected DDoS aacks are detected. e anomaly scores of
the time windows where the aacks lie (between 30 and 36) are above the predened threshold.
With the help of ID2T, we are able to demonstrate the DDoS detection capabilities of RNNs. is
use case scenario shows how ID2T can be used to reproduce and replicate the conclusions found
in other publications without necessarily having to use the same dataset. In this case, we use the
same type of background trac and aack. e original RNN publication, however, uses dierent
background trac (days of the MAWI dataset from almost two year ago in relation to this work).
7.1.2 Detecting Port Scans. Using ID2T, we test the capability of RNNs to detect port scans in
large networks. Figure 18 shows plots of the anomaly scores of three dierent datasets injected
with dierent port scan intensities. All injections take place at time window 30 and last 30 seconds
(3 time windows). On the top le of the gure, as a reference, we show the anomaly scores of the
target dataset without injected aacks. On the top right, we show the anomaly scores of the dataset
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aer injecting a port scan targeting 10,000 random ports of ve dierent host. On the boom le,
we show the anomaly scores when the injected port scan targeted ve hosts and randomly scanned
40,000 ports. Finally, on the boom right, we show the anomaly scores when the port scan targeted
ve hosts; scanning 10,000 random ports. e RNNs are able to detect all port scans as can be seen
by the anomaly scores that go beyond the marked threshold.
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Figure 18. Anomaly scores of dierent port scans of varying intensities.
7.2 Testing Configurations of Signature-based NIDSs
In the second use case, we test the conguration of two signature-based NIDSs using ID2T. By
injecting PCAP les with specically chosen exploits or malware, we test an arbitrary conguration
of Bro[26] and Suricata15.
Bro Suricata
Port Scan X1 x
EternalBlue Exploit X X2
FTP WinaXe Exploit x x
Sality Botnet Infection X X3
1 Identied as: Scan::Port Scan 188.165.214.141 scanned at least 15 unique ports of host 188.165.214.253 in 0m4s.
2 Exploit identied as: ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Reponse and ETPRO TROJAN (possible Metasploit payload).
3 Sality identied as: ETPRO TROJAN Win32/Sality.AM and ET MALWARE Sality Virus User Agent Detected (KUKU)
Table 3. Testing dierent IDSs againt four dierent aacks injected by ID2T.
Using ID2T, we inject four dierent aacks into a PCAP le of oce network trac collected
during a one minute interval. One minute of captured network trac was close to 30 MiB of data
and 55,000 packets. Because we inject small specialized aacks (that generate no more than 500
packets), this gives us enough room to hide our aacks. Table 3 shows the detection results of
Bro and Suricata when only basic signatures are installed. We mark successful detection with
an arrow (X). A cross (x) indicates that the corresponding malicious activity was not detected.
We emphasize that these are not the results of testing NIDSs themselves, but rather an arbitrary
set of signatures we installed. e port scan was detected by Bro. One of Bro’s anomaly rules
15hps://www.openinfosecfoundation.org
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found that the IP that we specied as an aacker was conducting port scans. Suricata, on the
other hand, was not congured with signatures capable of detecting port scans. Both NIDSs are
able to detect the popular “EnternalBlue” exploit. Suricata detected, additionally, that the payload
being used potentially originated from Metasploit. ID2T mimics what Metasploit does to create the
“EternalBlue” exploit. e FTP WinaXe Exploit is a dicult aack to detect. A signature for it cannot
be easily created as the exploit relies on overowing a particular FTP command that only aects
some vulnerable versions of the WinaXe program. Hence, as to be expected no NIDS detected the
malicious payload. Finally, both NIDSs correctly identify a Sality bot infection. Suricata is also able
to detect that the user agent of some HTTP trac is made by Sality. ID2T mimics how Sality sends
HTTP messages with the user agent eld set to “KUKU”.
7.3 Discussion of the Use Cases
e previous two use case scenarios help illustrate how ID2T can be used to either reproduce or
replicate results as well as to test the detection capabilities of an arbitrary setup of NIDSs. In the
rst use case, we reproduce the network intrusion detection capabilities of RNNs using dierent
days of the MAWI dataset (in contrast to the days used in the original publication). Although
the PCAP for training the RNN in the original publication and our use case come from MAWI,
there are almost two years of dierence between them. We argue that in the last two years the
characteristics of network trac in backbone networks have changed considerably [1]. In this
context, ID2T was able to help us reproduce past results that also apply to modern network trac
without creating an updated dataset from scratch. e process of creating new synthetic aacks
that ID2T can inject is considerably faster than publishing new datasets every time a novel aack
or network conguration needs to be tested.
In the second use case scenario, we use ID2T to test two popular NIDS. ID2T is a tool that enabled
the creation of network trac that contained certain aacks that are easy to detect using the right
signatures. We showed how a properly congured installation of the Bro and Suricata NIDSs are
able to detect expected aacks. ID2T can be used, therefore, to verify the correct operation of
already deployed systems.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We developed ID2T to try to address the long standing issue of not having reliable and reproducible
datasets in the NIDSs community. To evaluate systems, researchers in this community have a
tendency of using old, incomplete or private datasets that hamper their results. For example, it
is a common occurrence to nd new publications that use outdated datasets (such as the DARPA
1999 dataset). A system that demonstrates its capabilities on 19 year old network trac cannot be
trusted to work on modern trac. e problem of acquiring reliable datasets lies in the diculty
of creating datasets that are useful and, at the same time, fulll the conditions or constraints of
the dataset’s creators. Privacy, for example, is a major concern that ends up impacting a dataset
because of the way data is anonymized or concealed.
With ID2T, we provide a tool that enables the creation of custom datasets while solving the
problems of reproducibility and privacy preservation. Instead of providing a single static dataset,
ID2T gives researchers the tools to inject synthetic aacks into background trac they provide. e
injected aacks replicate the characteristics of the background trac to erase any trace that points
towards the usage of ID2T and the existence of synthetic trac. With such a tool, we envision
researchers demonstrating the usage of their systems by specifying the type of background trac
used and the parameters used to create an aack. For example, as illustrated in our use-case section
(see Section 7.1), we use backbone network trac to detect DDoS aacks and SMB probing scans.
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One key functionality of ID2T is that of replicating the characteristics of the provided background
trac in the synthetic aacks it generates. erefore, the properties of the background trac
impact the injected aacks. We developed the TIDED module of ID2T (see Section 5) for the
purpose of helping researchers to determine if the characteristics of the provided background trac
conform to their expectations. With such tests, for example, it is possible to determine if trac
that claims to come from a backbone network reects the properties of such a large network. With
TIDED, it is also possible to detect potential sources of defects that a dataset may have.
In future work, we wish to expand the capabilities of ID2T in two directions. First, we plan to
enlarge the arsenal of injectable aacks to include recent popular aacks. Second, we would like to
address the main limitation of ID2T. As it stands, ID2T has the limitation of not having a feedback
loop between the generated aacks and the background trac. In real scenarios, an aack aects
the characteristics of the network onto which it was launched. A DDoS aack, for example, may
cause a high number of TCP re-transmissions and lower average packet window sizes. e aacks
generated by ID2T are limited to only replicating what is observed in the background trac. It
is also desirable, for the purpose of creating more realistic trac, to model the interaction that
an aack has on the background data. With such an interaction, aacks would also modify the
background trac to either add, modify or delete packets.
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